Public Safety Minister must issue directive prohibiting the use of information obtained under torture
According to yesterday’s testimony before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security by CSIS lawyer Geoffrey O’Brian, CSIS continues to believe that information obtained under torture can be useful, and will use it in certain situations. “The simple truth is, if we get information which can prevent something like the Air India bombing, the Twin Towers – whatever, frankly – that is the time when we will use it despite the provenance of that information,” O’Brian told committee members. The Committee is hearing testimony on the findings and recommendations of the Arar Inquiry, and on the findings of the Iacobucci Inquiry, which determined that Canadian information sharing contributed to the detention and torture of Canadian citizens. Public Safety Minister Van Loan testifies tomorrow. While he is not appearing specifically to address this issue, it is likely he’ll be asked about it. I sure know what I’d ask him if I were on the Committee.
I’d like to know if the minister agrees that when intelligence agencies refuse to reject information obtained under torture they are encouraging more torture, and in essence maintaining a market for it.
I’d also know if the minister agrees that given that information obtained under torture has repeatedly and conclusively been demonstrated to be unreliable, that making use of it in any fashion in our intelligence work gives rise to a very real risk of creating a security risk.
Most importantly, I’d like to hear him commit to immediately issuing a Ministerial Directive prohibiting the use of information obtained under torture by any Canadian agency.
Ahmad El Maati’s case best illustrates CSIS’ use of tortured information. El Maati was detained and tortured in Syria after CSIS shared information with foreign agencies that inaccurately characterized him as being an “Islamic extremist” linked to “an aide of Osama Bin Laden.” The Iacobucci Inquiry has determined that this mislabeling likely contributed to El Maati’s detention and torture.
A couple of months later, on November 19, 2001, CSIS and the RCMP received El Maati’s so-called confession, extracted, we now know, through torture. CSIS and RCMP officials, incredibly, repeatedly told the Inquiry that at the time they had no evidence that Syria used torture, so didn’t consider that the confession might be the product of torture. Indeed, CSIS decided to try to corroborate the “confession” by sending more questions to be asked of El Maati by his torturers (see Iacobucci Report, page 364). Justice Iacobucci finds that these actions by both CSIS and the RCMP officials were deficient because they knew, or should have known about torture in Syria, and because their actions likely contributed to Mr. El Maati’s torture.
Meanwhile the RCMP used the so-called “confession” to justify search warrants conducted here in Canada in January 2002, without informing the presiding judge that the confession was likely the product of torture (see Iacobucci report, page 379). The information obtained through those searches, in turn, was sent to U.S. agencies, and that information was used to interrogate Mr. El Maati (using electric shock, among other methods) in Egypt. The information obtained in the searches also informed questions sent by the RCMP to Abdullah Almalki’s Syrian interrogators once he had been detained. Justice Iacobucci, of course, finds that sharing these questions was deficient, and contributed to both men’s torture.
The Arar Report’s eleventh recommendation calls on CSIS to “review their policies governing the circumstances in which they supply information to foreign governments with questionable human rights records.” It says that “information should never be supplied to a foreign country where there is a credible risk that it will cause or contribute to the use of torture. Policies should include specific directions aimed at eliminating any possible Canadian complicity in torture, avoiding the risk of other human rights abuses and ensuring accountability” (Arar Report, Analysis and Recommendations, page 345).
Justice O’Connor adds that “in every case, including those involving terrorism-related investigations, Canadian authorities should consider the justifications for and proportionality of any potential involvement with foreign governments that may result in human rights violations. There should be no blanket exception for terrorism-related investigations” (Arar Report, page 347).
Recommendation 15 says that “Canadian agencies should accept information from countries with questionable human rights records only after proper consideration of human rights implications.”
Justice O’Connor’s fifth recommendation calls for ministerial directives to be publicly issued to provide guidance for national security investigations, given the very grave implications of these investigations.
Indeed, another ministerial directive is long overdue. After the Arar Inquiry’s recommendations were released in September of 2006, Justice Iacobucci heard testimony from CSIS about another very disturbing ongoing practice. In May 2003, when the Egyptians were considering releasing Mr. El Maati, Justice Iacobucci finds that CSIS sent a memo to the Egyptians warning them not to release him. That memo, Justice Iacobucci finds, likely prolonged Mr. El Maati’s detention and put him at further risk of torture, especially because it contained a new, “inflammatory” allegation about Mr. El Maati –Justice Iacobucci says he could find no evidence to justify the new allegation.
When CSIS was asked about this new allegation at the inquiry, CSIS officials said they had labeled Mr. El Maati in this way just to see what the Egyptians would say in return – it was a sort of test to see if the Egyptians – the people torturing Mr. El Maati – agreed (Iacobucci report, page 181)!
Justice Iacobucci says in his report, on page 352, that “the evidence from CSIS witnesses was that there are no guidelines or policies about how people are described in communications with foreign agencies” and that one CSIS witness told the Inquiry that “the Service will characterize an individual, at least in part, to prompt a response from the receiving agency that will confirm or deny the assessment that the characterization reflects” (Iacobucci Report, page 352). Justice Iacobucci finds that “this is a very dangerous practice, one that puts the person labeled in this manner at risk, and increases the possibility that inaccurate information will be treated as credible” (page 352).
Dangerous indeed.
The CSIS official was describing an ongoing practice and lack of policy when providing evidence to the Iacobucci Inquiry, so this was occurring AFTER the release of the Arar Inquiry’s recommendations, and in direct defiance of Justice O’Connor’s 11th recommendation.
Justice Iacobucci says “It appears to me to be desirable that the Service have a clear policy concerning the manner in which people are described in communications with foreign agencies. This policy should not only extend to the use of appropriate qualifiers…but also the use of labels” (page 352).
I agree. Clearly we need a ministerial directive ensuring that CSIS develops a clear policy containing standards governing the use of labels in communications with foreign agencies.
Tags: Iacobucci, recommendations, torture
June 18th, 2009 at 7:39 am
[...] the use of proper qualifiers, in information shared with other domestic, and foreign agencies. See here for more [...]