Kerry Pither

The Iacobucci Inquiry has revealed yet another way in which the actions of CSIS agents likely contributed to the torture of Canadian citizen Ahmad El Maati.

Inquiry Commissioner Justice Frank Iacobucci Inquiry had hoped to include today’s revelation in its public report released in October 2008, but was forced to fight government claims of national security confidentiality.

The newly released information says that in June 2002, CSIS agents sent a message to Egyptian authorities trying to confirm that El Maati was in detention there, and telling them, among other things not disclosed, that he was involved in a plan to commit a terrorist act in Canada.

Justice Iacobucci has already confirmed that that this allegation was not based on evidence, but on an alleged “confession” obtained earlier from Syrian authorities – a “confession” that Iacobucci says CSIS should have known was likely the product of torture.

Justice Iacobucci criticizes CSIS for failing to take into account the potential consequences of sharing this allegation with the Egyptian authorities for El Maati.

He says once they confirmed El Maati was indeed in Egyptian detention, CSIS continued to communicate with the Egyptians, and sought permission from then CSIS deputy director of operations, Jack Hooper, to travel to Egypt later that year.

Hooper approved the trip, and apparently told the Inquiry that while he did consider the possibility El Maati might be mistreated as a result of the trip, he didn’t think that was likely, and, besides, it was more important to find determine if there really was a threat to Canada.

A list of questions was prepared, “to which it [CSIS] wished to obtain answers,” and the trip went ahead in December 2002.

Justice Iacobucci concludes that the information shared in June 2002, the list of questions, and the trip all likely contributed to El Maati’s mistreatment.

And Justice Iacobucci has already documented how El Maati was subsequently tortured in Egypt – with electric shock to his hands, back and genitals, and sleep deprivation while being subjected to excruciatingly painful stress torture for days on end.

Justice Iacobucci takes CSIS to task for failing to include enquiries about how El Maati was being treated.

But then again, as he confirmed in his report, CSIS had already been informed as early as July 2002 that El Maati had been tortured in Egyptian detention.

What Justice Iacobucci doesn’t tell us is what CSIS did with the questions.

Did the agents hand them over to El Maati’s interrogators? Did the agents witness or participate in any of El Maati’s interrogations? Did they get answers back?

Were there any subsequent trips to Egypt?

Today’s revelations have renewed calls by human rights advocates, and the men whose cases were examined by the Iacobucci Inquiry, for decisive action to ensure that Canada is never again complicit in torture.

“This revelation is particularly disturbing given the expanding powers being awarded to CSIS to act overseas, and the government’s continued refusal to beef up oversight and review not just of CSIS but all agencies involved in national security investigations,” said Warren Allmand, former solicitor general and a spokesperson for the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group.

“It has been more than three years since Justice Dennis O’Connor wrapped up the Arar Inquiry and recommended a new comprehensive model of review and oversight and it is long past time to implement that important proposal,” he added. “It is too late for Mr. El Maati, but it’s not too late for others.”

“At a time when Canadian officials should have been doing everything they could to extricate Mr. El Maati from the terrifying human rights violations, today we learn of another way that they were instead contributing to his suffering,” said Alex Neve, Secretary General of Amnesty International Canada.

“Combined with what we already knew about Canadian complicity in torture, it is outrageous that the government adamantly continues to refuse to apologize and offer redress to Mr. El Maati, along with Abdullah Almalki and Muayyed Nureddin,” Neve added. “The government must stop their callous fight against these three men in the courts and do the right thing: say sorry and provide compensation.”

In December last year, the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security won majority support in a House of Commons vote for its recommendations that the government issue compensation and an apology to El Maati, Almalki and Nureddin, and implement the Arar Inquiry’s recommendation for a more robust system of checks and balances for agencies involved in national security investigations.

Since then, however, efforts at mediating a settlement for the men have collapsed because of a federal government position the men’s counsel say “eliminates any possibility of resolution.”

Today’s news adds to a long list of ways that Justice Iacobucci has already revealed that Canadian agencies contributed to Mr. El Maati’s detention and torture.

When his report was first released in October 2008, it revealed that Canadian officials had likely contributed to Mr. El Maati’s mistreatment and torture in Egypt in three other ways: CSIS sent a letter to Egyptian authorities labeling Mr. El Maati with unjustified allegations and expressing concern should he be released; the RCMP repeatedly requested the opportunity to interview Mr. El Maati in Egyptian custody; and the RCMP freely shared information with U.S. authorities that made its way into the hands of Egyptian interrogators.

The report also concluded that Canadian officials likely contributed to Mr. El Maati’s initial detention by Syrian authorities when they shared his travel itinerary with the FBI and CIA, and when, in communications with the Syrians, they labeled him as linked to terrorism without first ensuring the allegations were accurate or justified.

Justice Iacobucci has also already revealed that Canadian officials likely contributed to Mr. El Maati’s torture in Syria by supplying questions for his Syrian interrogators, and, when they received his “confession,” failing to advise consular affairs officials that they knew Mr. El Maati was in Syrian detention and had been interrogated.

The report also concluded that the actions of Canadian officials likely contributed to the detention and torture of Canadian citizen Muayyed Nureddin, and to the torture of Abdullah Almalki, both in Syria.

Click here for an overview of what we already knew from the Iacobucci Report.

I will be testifying before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security this Tuesday, March 24, along with other advocates who want the government to implement all of the Arar Inquiry’s recommendations, including Justice O’Connor’s model for effective civilian oversight of the RCMP, CSIS and the numerous other agencies that participate in national security investigations. We’ll also be urging the committee to press the government to do as it did for Maher Arar, and issue a formal apology to Ahmad El Maati, Abdullah Almalki and Muayyed Nureddin for Canada’s role in their torture. I’ll be joined by Amnesty International’s secretary general Alex Neve; former solicitor general Warren Allmand representing the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group; Shirley Heafey, former chair and CEO of the RCMP’s Public Complaints Commission representing the BC Civil Liberties Association; and James Kafieh, counsel for the Canadian Arab Federation, the Canadian Council on American Islamic Relations and the Canadian Muslim Civil Liberties Association. The hearings are open to the public, and will be taking place from 9:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. in room 269 of the West Block on Parliament Hill. The meeting can be watched on line — it will be webcast live here.

The Commons Committee on Public Safety is supposed to begin hearings this week on the findings of the Iacobucci Inquiry, and the recommendations of the Arar Inquiry. These hearings are crucial. We’ve heard nothing from the government since the report’s release in October last year: The report confirmed that Canadian agencies did contribute to the detention of Ahmad El Maati and Muayyed Nureddin, and to their torture and the torture of Abdullah Almalki (by, for example, supplying the questions to those interrogating and torturing them). No-one in government has apologized to the men. There’s no sign that any Canadian official has been held accountable for their actions. And the Conservative government is still ignoring the Arar Inquiry’s recommendation, made more than two years ago, for effective and integrated civilian oversight of the agencies that carry out national security investigations. And without that oversight mechanism in place, it isn’t clear how Canadians can be confident that many of the Arar Inquiry’s other recommendations have been implemented.

It isn’t yet clear who will be appearing before the Public Safety Committee, or when they might be appearing. The committee was supposed to hear testimony from the RCMP, CSIS and the Canadian Border Services Agency on Tuesday — but that’s been cancelled or postponed. The Public Safety Minister was invited to appear this week but wasn’t available. So now it’s anticipated that witnesses from DFAIT, the Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP (CPC) and the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) will appear on Thursday.

Just eight days after the release of the Arar Inquiry’s report on September 18, 2006, former RCMP Commissioner Zaccardelli appeared as a witness at the Public Safety committee hearings. On that first day of hearings, he used the opportunity to apologize to Maher Arar and his family, but then went on to provide testimony for which he would later be forced to resign. The Public Safety committee’s study of the Arar case continued through to January 2007. Evidence for these meetings is available here.

The Public Safety Committee later tabled a report calling on the Canadian government to issue a formal apology to Mr. Arar, negotiate compensation for him and his family, register formal protest with the US for its rendition of Mr. Arar, register formal protests with Syria for torturing Mr. Arar, and implement all the findings of the Arar Commission.

I hope the Public Safety Committee will work towards a similar report this time, calling on the Canadian government to apologize to Messrs. El Maati, Almalki and Nureddin, to move swiftly into mediating compensation for the men so they can rebuild their shattered lives, to register formal protests against the governments of Syria and Egypt for brutally torturing these Canadians, to provide a full, detailed accounting of how the Arar Inquiry’s factual report’s recommendations have been implemented, and to immediately implement the Arar Inquiry’s recommended oversight mechanism for the agencies that conduct national security investigations.

For those who are interested, the Arar Inquiry’s reports and recommendations are available on its web site, which has been archived here.

Stay tuned…

The Harper government has given everyone less than a day’s notice that the Iacobucci Inquiry’s report will be released today, and seems intent on ensuring poor quality coverage by canceling the lock-up. The inquiry’s report will be released at 1:00 p.m. today, and followed by a news conference at 2:00 p.m. in the National Press Theatre in Ottawa. So it’s all about speed-reading. One hour for an estimated 350 pages. To help out, I’ve prepared three documents. Here is the shortest — ten things to look for in the report. The others are available here.

1. The Arar Inquiry found that the RCMP had no basis to label Maher Arar a terrorist in leaks to the media and in communications with the Americans. El Maati, Almalki and Nureddin, were labeled in the same way, and just like Arar, no evidence has ever been publicly produced to back the allegations. The Iacobucci Inquiry is the men’s best hope to clear their names.
2. The inquiry must determine whether, like in Arar’s case, Canadian agencies’ actions, such as sharing allegations of terrorist ties, influenced the decision by Syrian officials — and, in the case of El Maati, Egyptian officials — to detain them.
3. El Maati was followed to the airport in Toronto, questioned there before boarding his flight, and then followed on his flights to Syria on November 11 and 12, 2001. Were the men who followed El Maati from Canadian agencies?
4. All of these men were interrogated, under torture, with questions based on information that could only have come from Canada. The Arar Inquiry determined that the RCMP sent questions used to interrogate Almalki. How much of the information used in the interrogations of the other men was supplied by Canadian agencies?
5. The Arar Inquiry found that El Maati’s “confessions” under torture in Syria were used to justify warrants in Canada. Why and how did Canadian agencies make use of  these tainted “confessions”?
6. The Inquiry must determine why Almalki spent more than twenty-two months in Syrian detention without receiving a consular visit from Canadian officials, and, when he was released, was denied refuge in the Canadian embassy? It must also determine why El Maati did not receive any consular visits from Canadian officials until nine months into his incommunicado detention.
7. The Arar Inquiry found that Canadian agencies continued their investigations of Almalki and El Maati while they were in detention by pursuing the possibility of interviewing them there. Did these officials consider the impact of their actions on how these men were being treated, or on efforts to secure their release?
8. As in the case of Mr. Arar, unnamed Canadian officials used the media to accuse Mr. El Maati and Mr. Almalki of links to al-Qaeda. Which Canadian officials and agencies made these anonymous allegations in the media and why? Was this, as in the case of Mr. Arar, an intentional campaign by Canadian officials to harm the reputations of Mr. El Maati and Mr. Almalki? What impact did this have on their treatment in detention, and on efforts to secure their release?
9. In Mr. Nureddin’s case, anonymous “intelligence officials” told the National Post that Mr. Nureddin was suspected of having served as a “courier of money and information for an organization.” Who made this allegation and why? ?
10. Did Canadian agencies and officials impede efforts by the men’s families, human rights groups, and other Canadian officials to have these men released from custody? If so, why?

We all need answers about Canada’s role in the detention and torture of Ahmad El Maati, Abdullah Almalki and Muayyed Nureddin. I’ve written a backgrounder about the cases outlining some of the questions that the Iacobucci Inquiry report, due out soon, needs to answer: Questions we need answered by the Iacobucci Inquiry [pdf].

There’s also the extensive chronology I wrote before the Iacobucci Inquiry started its work, detailing information already in the public domain about the cases, and more than a hundred questions we need answers to. It was written before the Arar Inquiry’s addendum was released, and should be read alongside that.

On October 17, Amnesty International and other organizations with Intervenor status held a news conference to say that no matter what the outcome, the “internal inquiry” process should never be repeated. Here’s their backgrounder: The “Internal Inquiry” process: Fostering a culture of impunity [pdf].

If you’re trying to find the Arar Commission’s web site, it’s now located on the Library and Archives site.